LITERATURA ALEMÃ

NIETZSCHE’S SELF-EVALUATION AS THE DESTINY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANITY (Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am a Destiny 1’) – Werner Stegmaier, Univ. de Greifswald, 2010. (trad. Lisa Marie Anderson)

“No philosopher before Nietzsche spoke in this way; none declared himself the destiny of philosophy and of humanity. We must confront even this unheard-of claim and ask why he spoke in this way.” “Martin Heidegger especially insisted upon this; he saw Ecce Homo not as the ‘apotheosis of uninhibited self-presentation and boundless self-mirroring’ nor as ‘the harbinger of erupting madness’, nor even simply as a ‘biography’, but rather in fact as ‘a <destiny>, the destiny not of an individual but of the history of the era of modern times, of the end of the West.’ (Nietzsche. Vols. III/IV, ed. David Farrell Krell, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987, p. 3).”

Rodolphe Gasché, ‘Autobiography as Gestalt: Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo’, in Daniel O’Hara, ed., Why Nietzsche Now? (Bloomington 1985), 271-290.

“Peter Sloterdijk confirms Nietzsche’s ‘<selfishness>’ (45) or ‘<megalomania>’ (40), both of which he places in quotation marks: ‘The light values of Nietzsche’s most exposed statements about himself are so excessive that even the most benevolent and freethinking readers, even those who, in their intoxication, are agreeable to him, avert their eyes at these moments’ (40). But Sloterdijk also legitimizes this selfishness in describing ‘the event of Nietzsche as a catastrophe in the history of language’ (8) and his ‘obscene abundance of self-praise’ as the unleashing of the ‘eulogistic power of language’ or of ‘speaking well [Gutreden]’ – of speaking well not for Nietzsche’s own sake, but in order to overcome the ressentiment-laden ‘speaking-poorly-systems [Schlechtrede-Systeme]’ of metaphysics and morality (28f.). Sloterdijk writes that Nietzsche pursued ‘the revaluation of all embarrassments [Peinlichkeiten]’ with the ‘cynicism’ of a Diogenes of Sinope (46) and offered his readers a new innocence of extravagant speaking well through the ‘gift-giving virtue’ [virtude dadivosa, bela expressão] with which he has his Zarathustra speak (51). Of course, in the end Sloterdijk counts Nietzsche only as a ‘trend designer’ of the ‘individualistic wave’, as a ‘life-style-brand’: ‘Only a fool, only a poet, only an ad writer’ (54, 57). And not a philosopher? Peter Sloterdijk, Über die Verbesserung der guten Nachricht. Nietzsches fünftes ‘Evangelium’. Rede zum 100. Todestag von Friedrich Nietzsche, gehalten in Weimar am 25. August 2000 (Frankfurt 2001).”

“But this claim could also be ironic – in the sense of Socrates, whose assertion that he knew nothing could likewise only appear presumptuous in the face of his superior knowledge. Yet only under the protection of this presumption could Socrates question his interlocutors in such a presumptuous way as he did, thereby exposing all their knowledge as groundless. With irony he approached even the Oracle of the god of Delphi, which proclaimed destinies and had proclaimed that no one was wiser that Socrates – a proclamation that Socrates did not accept, as one generally would a divine oracle, but rather steadfastly set out to test.”

“With this double presumption, which cost him his life, he became the destiny of philosophy and of humanity and attained world-historical importance with his ‘world-historical irony’, as Nietzsche calls it (EH, WA 4).”

“By raising himself up, with world-historical irony, to the level of a divine standard, Nietzsche exposes the putatively divine standards as human ones.”

O CARAÇO DO ANGU: “Nietzsche’s thought cannot be measured by the standards it calls into question. Therefore one has to rely, as an experiment, on Nietzsche’s own standards. But these standards are, for their part, not readily grasped.”

PERFEITO ESPELHO DE PLATÃO: “Only this practice, as extensive and time-consuming as it is, guarantees a methodological analysis of Nietzsche’s philosophy that satisfies his methodological demand that his writings be read ‘slowly’ in their own contexts, without prematurely extracting general ‘lessons’ from them.”

“Alexander Nehamas remarks that ‘irony, which in Socrates’ case consists of saying <too little,> functions for him just as hyperbole, which is saying <too much,> functions for Nietzsche.’” Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge, Mass./London 1985), 26.

“Nietzsche speaks of ‘destiny’ [Schicksal] in his writings several hundred times. Here he uses the word in the title of the section but not in its first aphorism itself; there he uses the words ‘fate’ [Loos] and ‘calamity’ [Verhängniss].”

“to that end I must first go down deeper than ever I descended—deeper into pain than ever I descended, down into its blackest flood. Thus my destiny wants it. Well, I am ready.”

“‘destiny’ is a concept that we make for ourselves out of an unforeseeable and inalterable occurrence, in order to identify (and sometimes also to personify) the unidentifiable.” “in consciously unleashing the unforeseeable and inalterable, one can also ‘play destiny’ and thus ‘be destiny’ for someone or something.”

“According to its usual concept, a destiny is unwilled, ‘imposed’. To will one’s destiny is thus to make yet another paradox of the already paradoxical concept of destiny.” “That is why Nietzsche has Zarathustra call destiny an ‘experience’, something that can be experienced but not comprehended [begriffen].”

“To be sovereign is to be able to make something that one wills out of anything that happens. And those who will their destinies can also themselves function as destinies: they arrive ‘like destiny, without cause, reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as lightning appears, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too “different” even to be hated’.”

“In the aphorism Ecce Homo, Why I Am a Destiny 1, which comprises little more than a page (in the KSA edition [Kaufmann in English]), Nietzsche orients all the major themes of Western philosophy (destiny, religion, truth and politics) toward one vanishing point: himself and his revaluation of all values.”

“if one does not want to succumb to destiny, one must be hard and inexorable like destiny – by accepting that which is beyond his control as his own will”

“I find it necessary to wash my hands after I have come into contact with religious people”

Abluções cotidianas.

“I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the opposite of a No-saying spirit.”

…

“only beginning with me are there hopes again.”

…

“For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded into the air”

Still so far…

Aforismo nº 1 dividido em 22 seções.

[1]

“the word ‘lot’ [Los] emphasizes that which is random and uncontainable.”

nó

Ló

straw

“But prophets (at least those of the Hebrew Bible) do not foretell destinies so much as they primarily ‘see’ – despite the resistance of common foolishness – and then proclaim what has already happened (in the case of the biblical prophets, primarily the turning away of the chosen people from God) and what the consequences must be.”

Fritz Bamberger, eds., Die Lehren des Judentums nach den Quellen, 3 vols (Munich/Darmstadt 1999)

“It was and is his lot to be both an unheard and an unheard-of prophet, and he reveals this lot in the preliminary sections of Ecce Homo through a genealogy of his thought, from the random circumstances that came together to form his inevitable and necessary destiny, his destiny to be, with his ‘uncovering’, a ‘destiny of humanity’.”

[2]

“apparent certainty”

“whether he will become a destiny in the future depends on whether others recognize him as a destiny”

“It is dependent upon their future ‘memory’ of his ‘name’, upon whether individuals remember his name so that it lives on; the memory of others is his destiny.”

“A name, for its part, is a generally used sign for an individual; it is given by others before the individual himself can speak or say ‘I’.” E depois vêm os epítetos: O Filósofo do Martelo, A Dinamite Humana, Cila, O Grande, o Cínico, o Breve, etc….

“Even the name, then, is a destiny that one makes his own.” Even our dead parents (dead inside us, dead to us).

“Keith Ansell-Pearson & Howard Caygill, ‘On the Fate of the New Nietzsche,’ Ansell-Pearson and Caygill, eds., The Fate of the New Nietzsche (Aldershot 1993) 1-11:1. These are always supposed to be different Nietzsches, and yet also the true, only justified Nietzsches – or, in Zarathustra’s language, the ‘last’ Nietzsches. Nietzsche’s philosophy (and all ‘identities’, even that of the human being) is ‘mistaken’ at the very moment one wants to ‘determine’ it. Nietzsche opened EH with the adjuration: ‘Hear me! For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else’ (EH, Preface 1); perhaps he also designed EH as a kind of test for his readers, that they should mistake him and thus compromise themselves – using the notorious ‘self-parody’ that mocks all attempts to ascribe to him a true ‘self’. Daniel W. Conway, ‘Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger: Affirmation and Resentment in Ecce Homo’, The Fate of the New Nietzsche 55-78. Conway’s pugnacious essay targets the idolatry that he believes Alexander Nehamas and Richard Rorty [ora, ora!] have committed with Nietzsche and especially with Ecce Homo, which he thoroughly excoriates.”

Que moral você tem para…?

Mas que moral?, é a primeira questão.

“Derrida quotes EH, Why I Am A Destiny 1 in its entirety – in the context of the extent to which the ‘great politics’ with which the aphorism ends is implicated in the politics of the National Socialists who, fairly or not, invoked Nietzsche (31f.).” Cada um com seu presente.

“Habermas calls Nietzsche the ‘turning point’ that has turned the ‘discourse of modernity’, with the ‘goal of exploding modernity’s husk of reason’.” O problema é que Habermas enxerga isto com maus olhos! Como pode dialogar um homem que perdeu sua sombra?

Aquele que sempre tinha uma adversão – Aberman

“Nietzsche critiqued the metaphysical concept of reason … but also developed a new, quite differentiated concept of reason, which has yet to be explored in its contexts by Nietzsche researchers. For a critique of Lukács’s Nietzsche-critique, see Henning Ottmann, ‘Anti-Lukács. Eine Kritik der Nietzsche-Kritik von Georg Lukács,’ Nietzsche-Studien 13 (1984), 570-586, and Ottmann, Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche (Berlin/New York 1999), 429-433.”

“one only remembers that which one wants to remember or is compelled to remember. And Nietzsche aims at such a compulsion: with the aphorism in question he wants to ensure that his name will be remembered, will have to be remembered, that we cannot forget what was written in this name.” Se todos os séculos fossem pessoas, aliás, garotinhas com mesada do papai (moe concept), o XX seria um misto de spoiled brat com zero cents no bolso: séc. mais pobre, a despeito de si mesmo – era seu destino: teve pais ruins que viveram tempos melhores, eis tudo. O fato de eu ter nascido e sido feliz naquele século já é uma redenção, ou podemos dizer que ele durou apenas 87 anos.

[3]

o something tremendous

“Habermas judges Nietzsche to be just as dangerous as Nietzsche judged himself to be.” Ele não sabia brincar!

“When Kant conceived his ‘Critique’ of reason he was still very much certain that reason, though it had overstepped its bounds in the course of millennia and thus been merely ‘groping about’ among unprovable metaphysical belief systems, could be brought to the ‘secure course of a science’ through a secure measuring of its bounds.” Era então como poder um jardineco. Agora é preciso levar a mão de fora – e também a de dentro…

“Here reason was still the authority for a critique of itself, and as such also above experience and thus capable of a priori knowledge independent of temporal or personal circumstances.” Um verdadeiro jogo de sires!

“the critique of reason had arrived at a crisis and now demanded a reorientation from the ground up, especially in Europe, which had believed so firmly in one, timeless reason. But as Nietzsche noted in his Lenzer Heide note, this reorientation would lead initially to a massive disorientation, to the liberation of forces that can, in their desperation, only destroy and thus also want to destroy; and this ‘crisis’ would erupt in a ‘paroxysm’, a ‘blind raging’ ‘of nihilism and delight in destruction’.” Esperar algo mais brando seria esperar a revolução comunista sem a ditadura do proletariado – esperar a encenação de uma nova farsa européia.

“The ‘dangerous consequences’ became a prophecy: the world wars, totalitarianisms, genocides and terrorisms that characterized the twentieth century could be understood (at least in part) as the outcomes of the intellectual crisis that had befallen the fundamental convictions of European thought, in particular the conviction in the beneficial effects of a reason that was common to all.”

[4] Nietzsche becomes a pop star

“The dynamite metaphor, in opposition to the concept of a man, has held an extremely strong fascination for Nietzsche’s interpreters – especially for Sarah Kofman, whose whole interpretation of Ecce Homo comes under the title ‘Explosion’. [tão jurássico diante de Baudrillard!] She understands the Nietzsche revealed here precisely as a sudden explosion of long-accumulated forces, and she says herself Nietzsche’s text explodes tenacious, forceful interpretations. This is how she justifies his outlandishness (‘Bien compris, tout cela n’a vraiment rien de fou …’). Explosion I: De l’‘Ecce Homo’ de Nietzsche (Paris 1992), 21.” Seulement feu.

“Even the idea of the ‘equality of souls before God’ was, as Nietzsche says in The Antichrist 62, an ‘explosive of a concept which eventually became revolution, modern idea, and the principle of decline of the whole order of society – [was] Christian dynamite’.”

[5]

A bullsola de Nie.: certamente apontando para um norte hiperbóreo inusitado, sozinho no labirinto com o Minotauro! Tem que ter colhões – e fundadores de religiões são eunucos.

“A revaluation of all values like the one Nietzsche proclaims had to trigger a strong impetus for new religions – an impetus that we are also experiencing today.” E que época modorrenta essa das turning tables que nada viram! Metafísica da capotada. Trezentos e sessenta inúteis graus de inércia.

MELTDOWN

I found religion! (double sense)

I founded and I found.

But if I founded… triple sense!

Will find and will found and will found… a fond creed.

“Philosophers operate in dangerous proximity to founders of religion, only philosophers are less successful.” Síndrome de Licurgo.

“Pythagoras and Plato […] had souls and talents that fitted them so obviously for the role of religious founders that one can scarcely marvel enough that they should have failed. Yet all they managed to found were sects.”

Fico feliz em saber!

“‘None of the great Greek philosophers was a leader of the people: attempted most consistently by Empedocles (after Pythagoras), but also not with pure philosophy, but instead with a mythicized version of it. Others reject the people from the outset (Heraclitus). Others have a wholly refined circle of educated people as their public (Anaxagoras). Socrates displays the strongest democratic-demagogic tendency: the result is the establishment of sects, in other words, counterevidence. How could lesser philosophers ever be successful where philosophers of this sort were not? It is not possible to base a popular culture on philosophy. Thus, with regard to culture, philosophy never can have primary, but always only secondary, significance. How is it significant?”

Em fragmentos apenas recentemente publicados (provavelmente também da época de Gaia Ciência). Se considerarmos que os memes são uma religião, temos o Zizekismo – ji-jequismo, de ‘jeca’.

“Nietzsche also has Zarathustra make an attempt with disciples – and fail.” No final, os animais são os únicos que permanecem fiéis (duplo sentido).

Infiel!

[6]

“Only here does he use the formula ‘affairs of the rabble’ [Pöbel-Affairen]. No decent person wants to be the rabble – Nietzsche least of all.” Não cultivar a mesma religião que o lumpeNproletariado! Na gramática, quem fala mais alto, o português ou o alemão?

“But the scholar too is a ‘rabble man’, who because of his ‘faith in his superiority … treats the religious man as an inferior and lower type that he has outgrown, leaving it behind, beneath him’ (Beyond Good and Evil)¹”

¹ Jamais um livro (EH) foi um bricolage tão perfeito da obra de alguém. Não uma suma que só acrescenta, mas que realmente resume, comprime. Engenharia suprema, e de espantar Kubitschek (obra de poucos dias, duas mãos). É certo que a dívida externa de Nie. (sua falta de saúde) mais que decuplicou como resultado…

“In philosophy too there is the rabble, people who follow the prevailing truths and valuations in order to find approval and acclamation.” Rabble everywhere.

[7]

Quem nunca teve um amigo crente que atire a primeira pedra! clean attire

…

[8]

“To be evil is to do evil things to others, to do something that they believe harms them; to be malicious, on the other hand, is to remind others of what evil could be within them that they do not admit: a malicious person brings others to enlightenment about themselves.” Interessante. True nature post-pure malice: Gon x Killua.

“‘I think’ can easily indicate ‘I believe’ in German; in this case Nietzsche’s sentence would mean: ‘I believe I am too malicious to believe in myself’.”

“it assures the self to oneself and renders the self unsure at the same time.”

“On the other hand, ‘I think’ was precisely the signal for the modern Enlightenment, the call with which Descartes initiated it, so that no belief could go untested.” I think therefore I am too malicious. I am too malicious therefore I think.

Never to speak to the masses is never to speak with masses, but only doubts.

“For an enlightener, there is no certainty beyond this belief. Nietzsche’s phrasing is malicious in that it ironically allows for both readings, and only both of them together allow us to see what Nietzsche ‘wants’: to believe in his powers of enlightenment without ever being able to be sure of them.” Therefore he wants what he wants or he does not want (because he also has his fanatics).

“Nietzsche pays homage in Ecce Homo to Voltaire’s noble manner of enlightenment, to his ‘war without powder and smoke, without warlike poses, without pathos and strained limbs. […] One error after another is coolly placed on ice; the ideal is not refuted—it freezes to death.—Here, for example, <the genius> freezes to death; at the next corner, <the saint>; under a huge icicle, <the hero>; in the end, <faith>, so-called <conviction>; <pity> also cools down considerably—and almost everywhere <the thing in itself> freezes to death’ (EH, HH 1). See also HH II, WS 237.” E é óbvio que o herói-santo-autopiedoso congelado é Rousseau. Impossível pensar num Voltaire rosa na sala sem evocar o elefante da moral (V.xR.)…

[9]

“In the published text, ‘fanatic’ and ‘prophet’ have been contracted to ‘founder of a religion’, and ‘holy man’ replaces ‘god’: thus Nietzsche raises the ‘fanatic’ to the level of a ‘founder of a religion’ and pulls ‘god’ back to the level of a ‘holy man’.”

“Heinrich Köselitz pronounced Nietzsche ‘holy’ at his graveside; Alfred Kubin called Nietzsche ‘truly – our Christ’. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche tried unsuccessfully to have a mausoleum in the shape of an Egyptian pyramid erected for her brother on the Chasté peninsula near Sils-Maria; she was successful in establishing the Nietzsche archive she founded in Weimar as a cultic site and a place of pilgrimage. [mais uma instância repulsiva da irmã divinizadora do irmão, Lisbeth Artemisia – ver “NOTA SOBRE DISCUSSÕES (SAUDÁVEIS) EM TRADUÇÃO!” em https://seclusao.org/2023/12/21/depois-de-desligar-o-videogame-o-supercompendio-de-final-fantasy-viii/#]”

“George’s disciple Ernst Bertram (Nietzsche. Versuch einer Mythologie, Berlin 1918) wanted to immortalize Nietzsche as a tragic hero. And countless half-moral, half-religious ‘movements’ have invoked Nietzsche, including vegetarianism,¹ feminism¹ and Zionism.¹ Indeed, this kind of thing has happened to no other philosopher to date.”

¹ Mas se não é o tríplice cúmulo do absurdo – venerar um “deus” misógino, onívoro depreciativo de quem não comia carne e mais que tudo deprecador do Estado!

[10]

“A buffoon is malicious without being taken seriously. His malice does not offend, but is enjoyed.” Mestre Trágico do Existir, early icon do blog.

“the holy man constrains one to an either-or. [Kierk.] But one is free before the buffoon; one can believe him one time and then laugh at him another time. This is the freedom that is important to Nietzsche, given the seriousness of the ‘destiny’ of the ‘task’ that he has taken on as his destiny.”

[11]

“The tension of this text – the loftiest in Nietzsche’s oeuvre – is now heightened to the extreme, evincing the agitation, passion and anger of a great prophet and thereby calling into question all objectivity. Nietzsche is now writing, speaking, breathlessly: with ellipses (‘…’), as if there were not enough time to utter the words; with insertions (parentheses), as if interrupting himself; with breaks marked by dashes (‘—’), as if there were no space for logical conjunctions.”

“According to Schlaffer, a literary scholar, Nietzsche’s style is responsible for the unfettering of German prose and, consequently, of German history: ‘Such an energy of language and style intensified the meaning of German literature at the beginning of the modernist period, but also intensified the confusion of German intelligence and the catastrophe of German politics’ (12f.). What must the condition of an intelligence and a politics have been, that they were so confused by a literary style?” Hahahaha!

[12]

“In John’s Gospel (14:6) Christ said of himself: ‘I am the way and the truth and the life’. Nietzsche does not say ‘I am the truth’ but rather ‘the truth speaks out of me’”

“The other side of the truth is either the unintentional error or the intentional lie. The unintentional or intentional ‘mendaciousness’ of a holy man – or of a man who is believed to be holy, even if he is a philosopher – lies in the exclusion of the alternative that is always possible.”

[13]

“This revaluation cannot itself be a truth in the traditional sense, but rather only a ‘formula’.”

“Indeed Nietzsche insinuates autobiographical material more than he narrates it, and the little that he does narrate (which Samuel compiles on the basis of a control text that Montinari has rendered obsolete) he also pointedly stylizes and puts into riddles: ‘I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming old.’ EH, Why I Am So Wise 1.” “If EH is an autobiography, then it is, as Sarah Kofman notes in her interpretation, one that radically subverts the ‘<genre> autobiographique’, including the self (‘autos’), life (‘bios’) and writing (‘graphein’), as well as their alleged simple unity.”

[14]

“A genius is simply someone who, in his own hardship, rather randomly finds new and far reaching possibilities for others (see HH I 231).”

“Thus genius is more a matter of destiny than of merit. The genius does not even hold in his hands impact of the forces that are stored up in him; it is rather circumstances and the age that set off this impact”

[15]

“Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘decency’, like that of ‘destiny’, ‘rabble’, and ‘fear’, is shot through with an astonishing revaluation, which I cannot trace here. Again the revaluation is directed toward himself, toward that which he calls ‘intellectual integrity’ and does not find to a similar degree in anyone else.”

[16]

“He has nothing more than this opposition, his personal opposition to the moral opposition of truth and lie that has reigned in European thought for millennia. Millennia are Nietzsche’s philosophical measure of time: he has in mind primarily the two millennia that have passed since the founding of philosophy and Christianity, but also the fact that Europe must ‘cast its goals millennia hence’, that it stands under the ‘compulsion to great politics’ (BGE 208). This is the measure of time that measures up to his revaluation.”

[17]

“One does not bother to contradict them anymore, but rather stumbles into opposition to them by living differently, experiencing differently, thinking differently. Nietzsche approaches metaphysical oppositions from the place that their millennia-old cult has most staunchly excluded: experience.” Experiências não-replicáveis em laboratório. For Philistines demise!

[18]

“Where someone stands in relation to himself, how someone deceives himself, whether he persists in dealing with himself unequivocally, — whether he can bear himself or finds it necessary to have an <ideal> … The idealist smells bad to me…”

Espólio

“Nostrils are the olfactory organs of horses: Nietzsche is likely alluding to Plato’s famous myth of the soul as a chariot (Phaedrus, 246 a-b), in which reason directs the horses but is also dragged along by them.”

[19]

Não diga não

refluxo é um crime gástrico

hediondo die-o’-niza

[20]

“glad tidings”

[21]

amen como ainda uma vez

[22] EPÍLOGO-PRÓLOGO

“The event of the ‘revaluation of all values’ will surpass everything that has been; the painful struggle in philosophy, science, morality and religion will transcend those realms and shock even the common orientation from the ground up. In this crisis Christian morality, as dogmatized by the Greeks, will manifest its deep rootedness in the thought of Europeans and will thus determine the politics whose most extreme means is war. But wars over values will no longer be mere struggles for power, [o que é ‘poder’?] which can be ended by dynasties or nations as easily as they were incited, but rather ‘war[s] of spirits’ with and over truths, morals, religions – in short, ideologies, which creep and spread for a long time and then suddenly make an explosive impact. They are, as the twentieth century sufficiently demonstrated, the most

dangerous dynamite, further and literally employed by terrorism in the twenty-first century, as well.” O terrorismo é passivo-reativo. Pode durar mil anos. Mas aqui repito o que disse na análise do livro de Dugin: ele acertou só que do avesso: o liberalismo (cristianismo, a essa altura) morreu, e a guerra travada é entre fascismo e socialismo – o fascismo no entanto é natimorto, é a anti-vida. Essa é a lenta história que estamos prestigiando, ainda no prólogo do prólogo… Que este fosse o ponto cego de Nietzsche – enxergar o socialismo como movimento do lumpenproletariado – era inevitável…

“‘And if you cannot be saints of knowledge, at least be its warriors’ (Z I, On War and Warriors).” Idealismo, porém são. Nem parece idealismo.

“As his notes in the margin of EH show, Nietzsche does not take sides with peoples or nations, estates or classes, even less with races. Instead he wants to ‘found a party of life, strong enough for great politics’ (Nachlass December 1888 – early January 1889, 25[1], KSA 13, 637f.” “It is ‘madness’, for Nietzsche, that wars among dynasties or nations would ‘put elites of strength and youth and power before the cannons’ (ibid., 25[15], KSA 13, 645”

“I honestly think it possible to bring order to the whole absurd situation of Europe by means of a kind of world-historical laughter, without even a drop of blood having to flow. In other words: the Journal des Débats is enough …”

(Nietzsche to Jean Bourdeau, presumably January 1, 1889, KSB 8, No. 1232, p. 570)

“According to Balke, Nietzsche is only drawing the consequences from that which Michel Foucault would call ‘biopolitics’, and which had been immanent in European politics for ages, as Peter Sloterdijk then pointed out.” Foucault está sendo superestimado nesse panorama.

“Now wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone.”

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1

ok! posso rever meu juízo sobre F….

“But this is not a manifesto for the killing of the disabled and certainly not for the murder of European Jews. The National Socialists, with their nationalism, socialism and anti-Semitism, would have been an abomination to Nietzsche” What socialism? In the name? Stupidity of a high level. O nome ‘socialismo’ foi o que permitiu a Hitler vencer as eleições em 1932. E só essa função exerceu no regime nazista.

“I know nothing that would be more opposed to the noble meaning of my task than this execrable incitement to the egoism of a nation [Volk] or a race that now lays claim to the name ‘great politics’; I have no words to express my contempt for the intellectual standard that now, in the form of the German Reich Chancellor and with the Prussian officer-attitudes of the Hohenzollern house, believes itself called to be the ruler of the history of humanity […]. There is more dynamite between heaven and earth than is dreamt of by these bloodstained idiots…”

(Nachlass 1888/89, 25[6]2, KSA 13, 640f.).

OVERMAN IS GREAT MAN: “Nietzsche used the phrase ‘great politics’ early on, at first (and ironically) for the new German Empire. In his later work ‘great’ means not that which towers over other things, but rather that which is not negated by its opposition, does not perish by it, but rather can make it fruitful for himself and grow from it. In this way the ‘great reason of the body’ makes the ‘little reason’, pure reason, its ‘instrument and toy’ (Z I, On the Despisers of the Body); a ‘great health’ can ‘give itself up’ to grave sickness and thus become more robust (GS 382); ‘the great life’ itself lives off of war (TI, Morality as Anti-Nature 3); ‘great tolerance’ can, with ‘magnanimous self-mastery’, [deixar os fracos viverem, embora confinados e tornados inofensivos – o ideal para um mundo em que bolsominions insistam em nascer] tolerate intolerance and grow from it (AC 38); and ‘great style’ can unite the highest pathos with sobriety and cheer (EH, Why I Write Such Good Books 4). In this sense, ‘great politics’ is a politics that includes that which is usually opposed to it: spirit, in the form of morality, religion, science, philosophy, or ‘a war of spirits’. In his alarming ‘promemoria’ to ‘great politics’, written at the turn from 1888 to 1889, Nietzsche is still concerned with a politics of war ‘not between nation and nation’ and ‘not between classes’, but rather ‘straight through all absurd accidents of nation, class, race, profession, upbringing, education: a war as between rise and fall, between the will to life and vengefulness against life, between integrity and treacherous mendacity…’” Insisto em que a classe proletária madura é a classe que representa a vida. E outra coisa: a Europa não ressurgirá das cinzas. N. foi o primeiro pós-europeu, como Platão o último pré-europeu significativo.

“Nietzsche’s title Ecce Homo, which appears 3 times in his work might also recall the traditional ceremony of the ‘Ecce’ in Schulpforta, the memorial ceremony for deceased professors and alumni on the day before the final Sunday of the liturgical year, which clearly had a deep impact on its participants. Pupils and teachers sang ‘Ecce quomodo moritur justus’. According to numerous reports, the ceremony made such an impression on the students that they automatically connected the ‘Ecce’ to their own deaths. Even the National Socialists preserved the ‘Ecce’ ceremony when they turned Schulpforte into a ‘National Political Institute of Education’ in 1935. See Reiner Bohley, Die Christlichkeit einer Schule: Schulpforte zur Schulzeit Nietzsches, ed. Kai Agthe (Jena/Quedlinburg 2007), 135-8. Nietzsche experienced 5 general and 7 special ‘Ecce’ ceremonies, which he mentions primarily in his letters: see, for example, Nietzsche to Franziska Nietzsche, August 20, 1860, KSB 1, No. 169, p. 120. Thus, with his Ecce Homo, he could have been (again, ironically?) singing his own death song. In ‘Joke, Cunning, and Revenge’, the ‘Prelude in German Rhymes’ to The Gay Science, he included a poem, modelled after Goethe, called ‘Ecce homo’:

‘Yes! I know from where I came!

Ever hungry like a flame,

I consume myself and glow.

Light grows all that I conceive,

Ashes everything I leave:

Flame I am assuredly’

(No. 62)

But he also knows that ‘some wretched loafer of a moralist’ can ‘paint himself on the wall’ as the image of the human ‘and comment, <Ecce homo!>’ (TI, Morality as Anti-Nature 6). And he ultimately titled the genealogy of his ‘destiny’ Ecce Homo – which earns him the charge of ‘duplicity’ and ‘resentment’ from Conway (‘Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger’, 63-6).”

* * *

“Paul supported the Christian truth of love, so that he could spread it around the world, through the Greek truth of the universal; Paul’s successors retained the Greek truth in the name of the Christian truth, so that both truths, despite their very different origins, found stability in each other for millennia. If the absolute value of this Greek-Christian truth has now become unbelievable, then the ‘tasks’ of giving to humanity new values and the ‘hopes’ that rest upon them fall, according to Nietzsche, back to individuals with the power to do so, a power that must match or even exceed that of Socrates and Jesus of Nazareth. Nietzsche tried to give form to such power in his Zarathustra, the figure of an individual person with a proven ‘courage to stand alone’ and to be ‘lonely’ even and especially in his thought. Moreover, Nietzsche placed his philosophy under the ‘concept of Dionysus’, the god who unites in himself all oppositions in which humans arrange their world and thus brings them into motion ever anew, against the desire to solidify them as much as possible so as to achieve a lasting stability.”

“Thus can one take even this unheard-of aphorism philosophically seriously and at its word.”

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